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The Impact Of Medical Technology
On The Pregnant Woman's
Right To Privacy*
George J. Annas**
In the context of the bicentennial of the Constitution and sci-
ence's relationship to society, it has been argued that "the advance
of science and technology in the West has changed not only the rela-
tion of man to nature but of man to man."' This seemingly immod-
est statement may soon prove an understatement. In the arena of
human reproduction, the marriage of science and technology in
medicine may change not only the relationship of man to nature and
man to man, but more significantly, the very concept of what it
means to be human. This, in turn, will directly affect how we define
the "rights" this "new human" may properly claim.
This article begins to explore developing reproductive medical
technology with a view toward examining the way it might change
our concept of humanness, and how this change might be accommo-
dated, encouraged, or truncated by the relationship between the
government and its pregnant citizens as defined by the United
States Constitution and the "right to privacy." This review is espe-
cially appropriate in the context of honoring Justice Harry Black-
mun, and I hope he will find in this discussion much he is
responsible for, and much with which he can agree.
THE CONSTITUTION AT THE BEGINNING OF LIFE
Modifications in the mode of human reproduction have long
been viewed as science fiction and have occasioned both fear and
amazement. In Orwell's 1984,2 for example, AID (artificial insemi-
nation by donor) is mandatory, and sexual pleasure and the family
* This article is adapted from an essay originally prepared for the United States
Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, as part of its project on "Technology and the
Constitution" for the Bicentennial. Contract No. H3-3020.0 (1987).
** GeorgeJ. Annas,J.D., M.P.H., Edward R. Utley Professor of Health Law, Boston Uni-
versity Schools of Medicine and Public Health. Copyright 1988 by George J. Annas.
I Piel, Natural Philosophy in the Constitution, 233 SCIENCE 1056, 1057 (1986).
2G. ORWELL, 1984 (1949).
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are destroyed to help maintain the tension necessary in a society
dedicated to perpetual warfare. In Huxley's Brave New World,3 de-
struction of the family is also critical, but it is accomplished by sex-
ual gratification and freedom. Reproduction becomes the exclusive
domain of the state: embryos are produced and monitored in state-
run "hatcheries" using artificial uteruses.
More recent post nuclear war views of methods of reproduction
have been pessimistic. Margaret Atwood pictures most women as
sterile and sees fertile women forced to act as surrogate wives to
bear children for the sterile wives of the wealthy. In her Handmaid's
Tale,4 these surrogate wives are "two-legged wombs.., ambulatory
chalices." 5 In Paul Theroux's O-Zone,6 AID clinics gradually evolve
to provide anonymous but "natural" sex for sperm transmission,
and finally degenerate into anonymous sex parlors where providing
the opportunity for sex, rather than reproduction, is their primary
function.
We may, of course, avoid all of these futures. But the centrality
of the family, and its formation based on the sexual reproduction by
husband and wife, assure us that major changes in modes of repro-
duction will not only challenge traditional assumptions about the
nature of the family and kinship relations, but will likely lead to ma-
jor changes in our social structure as well.
The Supreme Court has yet to consider constitutional issues in
the context of human reproduction by noncoital reproductive tech-
nologies that permit reproduction without sexual intercourse.
7
Nonetheless, past cases dealing with sterilization, contraception and
abortion provide significant clues as to how an individual's constitu-
tional right to privacy is likely to be viewed in the event of govern-
ment prohibition or regulation of these technologies.
In general, constitutional interpretation has depended heavily
on prevailing social and scientific views, as well as on advances in
technology. The sterilization cases decided prior to World War II
reflect the values in the eugenics movement of the early 1900's.
Later, they reflect newly available medical alternatives to steriliza-
tion and a more sophisticated view of genetics. Likewise, contracep-
3 
A. HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1931). See also A. HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD REVIS-
rIED at 26 (1958).
4 M. ATWOOD, THE HANDMAID'S TALE (1986).
5 1d.
6 p. THEROUX, O-ZONE. (1986).
7 These technologies include AID, IVF, the use of frozen embryos, surrogate embryo
transfer (SET), gamete intrafallopian transfer (GIFT), and more extreme possibilities such as
cross-species fertilization, total extracorporeal gestation, and cloning. See Elias & Annas, So-
cial Policy Considerations in Noncoital Reproduction, 255 JAMA 62 (1986).
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tion and abortion were made part of a pregnant woman's right to
privacy only after safe and effective techniques had been developed
by the medical profession. And the state's interest in regulating
abortion for maternal health has been determined exclusively by
reference to the safety of the technology itself. The existence of
new medical technology does not determine the outcome of these
constitutional issues. Nonetheless, technological advances in the
field of reproduction have had a prominent impact on the shape and
substance of constitutional interpretation.
STERILIZATION AND THE "RIGHT TO PROCREATE"
The most notorious case involving human reproduction, Buck v.
Bell,' was decided by the Supreme Court in 1927. In that case the
Court upheld a Virginia statute that permitted, among other things,
the involuntary sterilization of the "feeble-minded." 9 Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes wrote for the Court:
It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute
degenerate offspring for crime, or let them starve for their
imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly un-
fit from continuing their kind . . . Three generations of
imbeciles are enough.' 0
This case capped three decades of the eugenics movement in the
United States and was heavily influenced by it. It suggested consti-
tutional support for a movement to limit the right to procreate to
those with sufficiently high I.Q.s.
Fifteen years later, in Skinner v. Oklahoma," the Court struck
down an Oklahoma statute that provided for the compulsory sterili-
zation of "habitual criminals." The law applied to larceny, but spe-
cifically exempted persons convicted of embezzlement.' 2 The
eugenics movement had fallen into disfavor, and the Court began to
examine the rights of the individual.
The Court ruled that the statute violated the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. In addition, the Court also
affirmed the fundamental "value of reproductive autonomy over a
majoritarian decision in favor of sterilization."' 3 In the Court's
words:
We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of
8 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
9 Id. at 205.
10Id. at 207 (1927).
"1 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
12 Id. at 536-37.
13 1d. at 541.
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the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fun-
damental to the very existence and survival of the race. The power
to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far-reaching and
devastating effects. In evil or reckless hands it can cause
races or types which are inimical to the dominant group to
wither and disappear.' 4
Buck v. Bell has never been explicitly overturned. In light of
Skinner and subsequent cases, however, the vast majority of com-
mentators believe it is no longer good law and that, at the very least,
the Court would require a high level of procedural protection
before any involuntary sterilization would be permitted.' 5
CONTRACEPTION, ABORTION AND THE "RIGHT NOT TO PROCREATE"
Contraception and abortion have been both highly regulated
and outlawed altogether.' 6 The changing mores of society and the
womens rights movement undoubtedly had a major impact on the
Court's changing views of these medical technologies. But the de-
velopment of an effective oral contraceptive, and of a safe and effec-
tive means of first trimester abortion (suction aspiration),
contributed more to change the Court's views than has generally
been recognized. For example, the Supreme Court's leading deci-
sion on contraception, which enunciated the "right to privacy" for
the first time in the reproduction context, 17 was rendered shortly
after oral contraception (introduced in 1960) became popular in the
United States.
In Griswold v. Connecticut,'8 a Connecticut statute that forbade
the use of contraceptives was struck down as an unconstitutional vi-
olation of the "zones of privacy" that surround sexual relations in
marriage.' 9 Seven years later, in Eisenstadt v. Baird,2°the Court de-
termined that it was the sexual relationship and the potential to pro-
duce a child that was critical, not the marriage itself. A statute that
applied only to prohibit nonmarried individuals from using contra-
ception was thus unconstitutional as well:
If the right to privacy means anything, it is the right of the
14 Id. (emphasis added).
15 See e.g., In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981); Baron, Involuntary Sterilization of
the Mentally Retarded in GENETICS AND THE LAw (A. Milunsky & G. Annas eds. 1976).
16Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 138-41 (1973).
17 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
18 1d.
19 Id. at 484. The statute had been upheld as a valid exercise of the state's police powers
(to "preserve and protect the public morals") as recently as 1940. State v. Nelson, 126 Conn.
412, 425 (1940).
20 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusions into matters so fundamentally af-
fecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child.2
The final series of cases deal with abortion. Roe v. Wade,2" per-
haps more than any other decision in history, was framed by a series
of scientific and medical determinations adopted by the Court. This
was presaged in the rationale for determining that the right to pri-
vacy was broad enough to encompass abortion. To justify this con-
clusion, the Court relied almost exclusively on the medical and
psychological harm the state would impose upon a woman by deny-
ing her this choice:
Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early
pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or additional off-
spring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and fu-
ture. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and
physical health may be taxed by child care ... All of these
factors the woman and her responsible physician will consider in
consultation.
23
Even more important was the role assigned to medicine and
technology in sketching the potentially compelling state interests in-
volved. As far as the state's interest in protecting human life (i.e.
fetal life), this became compelling not at conception, quickening, or
birth, but rather at "viability." According to the Court, "viability"
was chosen for only one reason:
Physicians and their scientific colleagues have regarded [quicken-
ing] with less interest and have tended to focus either upon
conception or upon live birth or upon the interim point at
which the fetus becomes "viable", that is, potentially able to live
outside the mother's womb, albeit it with artificial aid.
2 4
The viability standard was adopted on the strength of citing no
more than an entry in a medical dictionary and another in an obstet-
rics text. Why this standard should have legal significance was never
explained or logically justified by the Court, prompting one com-
mentator to exclaim that the court had substituted a "definition for
syllogism. "25
The Court's discussion of the state's interest in protecting the
health of pregnant woman is even more impressive in terms of bow-
21 Id. at 453.
22410 U.S. 113 (1973).
23 Id. at 153 (emphasis added).
24 Id. at 160 (emphasis added).
25 Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Commentary on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920,924 (1973).
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ing to the imperative of medical technology. The point in preg-
nancy at which the state's interest in regulating abortion to protect
the woman became compelling was to be determined "in the light of
present medical knowledge." '26 On this basis, the Court put it at
"approximately the end of the first trimester," because until that
time, maternal "mortality in abortion may be less than mortality in
normal childbirth. ' 27 In the past, abortion had always placed the
woman's life "in serious jeopardy; [but] ... [m]odern medical tech-
niques have altered this situation. '28 This conclusion is based on
five studies from the medical literature, cited by the Court in foot-
note 44 of the opinion. The articles primarily focus on the develop-
ment and safety record of dilation and evacuation or "vacuum
aspiration," and dilation and curettage abortions performed during
the first trimester. Thus, it is fair to conclude that the state's inter-
est in regulating abortion was determined by the medical profession
(and its development and use of safe methods of abortion).
In her dissent in a case decided a decade later, Justice Sandra
O'Connor noted that the state's interest in regulation will continue to
be decided by medical technology because the time period during
which the woman and her physician are free to make the abortion
decision will expand as the safety of existing or new abortion tech-
niques improves.29 This has in fact already happened, as abortion
can now be safely performed as an office procedure for the first 16
weeks of pregnancy. 0
The point is that medical technology itself is driving the deci-
sions of the Court in defining large areas of the state's role in
human reproduction. Justice O'Connor has criticized the Court's
apparent "science court" approach in these matters, noting that Roe
v. Wade is on a "collision course" with itself as medicine makes abor-
tions safer.3 1 Her point, however, seems misplaced. The Court's
decisions must be influenced by science and technology, because the
Court must deal with the real world. The real world changes as sci-
ence, technology and medicine develop and test new methods of
sterilization, contraception, abortion and procreation.
Issues concerning rights to use a technology on the part of indi-
viduals, and rights to regulate a technology on the part of the gov-
ernment, do not even arise until the technology at issue is




29 Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416,456 (1983) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting).
3 0 Id. at 437.
31 Id. at 458 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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developed and made available. Although we cannot know how the
Court will react to technologies not yet developed, or to new tech-
nologies just becoming available, we can hazard some reasonable
guesses based on the Court's treatment of sterilization, abortion
and procreation. A reasonable way to start is by examining how the
Court might react to various legislative controls over in vitro fertili-
zation (IVF), including the use of frozen embryos.
Physician-philosopher Leon Kass has properly noted that in de-
veloping new ways to reproduce, we are considering
not merely new ways of beginning individual human lives
but also . . . new ways of life and new ways of viewing life
and the nature of man. Man is defined partly by his origins
and his lineage; to be bound up with parents, siblings, an-
cestors, and descendants is part of what we mean by
human. By tampering with and confounding these origins
and linkages, we are involved in nothing less than creating a new
conception of what it means to be human.32
In this regard, IVF, confined to married couples using their
own gametes, actually raises fewer confounding questions than any
of the new reproductive technologies.3 3 IVF was originally devel-
oped as a method to bypass diseased fallopian tubes by removing
ova from the ovaries by a surgical procedure, combining the ova
with sperm from the woman's husband in a petri dish, and, after
fertilization and a number of cell divisions, transferring the embryo
into the woman's uterus for implantation. 4 Used within marriage,
IVF presents only one major constitutional issue: can the govern-
ment prohibit the use of IVF on the basis that it involves potential
harm to the extracorporeal embryo? The answer to this question
seems to be no, based primarily on the Roe v. Wade analysis, that the
embryo itself is not "viable" (unless placed into a host uterus). The
embryo is not a person and it has no rights as such. Nor can any
interests it has overcome the rights of its "parents" to decide to use
or not to use it to procreate. A more interesting question is whether
the parents could object to a statute requiring that any "left over"
or spare embryos (i.e. ones created but not transferred to the wo-
man) be frozen and "donated" to couples unable to produce their
own embryos. The claim on the part of the state would be that this
use would protect the embryos' "right to life," and the state's inter-
32 L. KASS, TOWARD A MORE NATURAL SCIENCE: BIOLOGY AND HUMAN AFFAIRS 48
(1985)(emphasis added).
33 S. ELIAS & G. ANNAS, REPRODUCTIVE GENETICS AND THE LAW 224 (1987).
34 Annas & Elias, In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer. Medicolegal Aspects of a New Tech-
nique to Create a Family, 17 FAM. L.Q. 199 (1983).
220 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. XIII NO. 2-3
est in fetal life.3 ' The counter-claim would be that an early-stage
embryo has no more "right to life" than a sperm or egg (i.e. none).
Thus, any interests the parents might have in not having their ge-
netic child reared outside of their family would take precedence, as-
suming that such a result could be psychologically harmful to them.
Whether the state could constitutionally forbid experimentation on
spare embryos would depend upon how society views the embryo,
what protections can be afforded it, and the purposes and impor-
tance of the experiment.
3 6
SURROGACY
Couples may want to freeze spare embryos for other purposes,
such as for use in another cycle. The use of frozen embryos, of
course, raises many other possibilities that the state may want to
regulate or forbid. For example, the embryo could be transferred
not to the wife, but to a "surrogate mother," who could be hired to
gestate the embryo for the couple. In this instance, IVF (with the
surrogate) would be used not to bypass fallopian tube disease, but
to permit the couple to avoid pregnancy altogether and still have a
child composed of their genes. The line of cases discussed so far
holds that a married couple (and arguably heterosexual unmarried
couple) must be free from state interference in making a decision to
bear or beget a child.37 In addition, a pregnant woman and her phy-
sician must be in a position to make an abortion decision without
state interference, at least prior to the point at which abortion be-
comes more dangerous than childbirth for the woman. Fetuses can
be protected from their mothers by the state only after viability, and
then only in ways that do not harm the mother herself. 8
Use of a surrogate, however, introduces a third, unrelated,
party into the process of procreation. The state might have a
stronger interest in protecting this person from possible exploita-
tion. For example, the Constitution would probably prohibit a wo-
man from irrevocably waiving or alienating her right to abort the
fetus by promising never to have an abortion, because specific en-
forcement of this contract would be so highly intrusive to the per-
sonhood of the woman.
3 9
M Robertson, Embryos, Families and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the New Reproduc-
tion, 59 So. CAL. L. REV. 939, 977 (1986).
36 Id.; Annas, The Ethics of Embryo Research: Not as Easy as it Sounds, 14 L., MED. & HEALTH
CARE 138 (1986).
37 See e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
38 See Roe v. Wade, supra note 22.
39 Note, Rumpelstilskin Revisited: The Inalienable Rights of Surrogate Mothers, 99 HARV. L. REV.
1936 (1986). Even the lower court judge in the Baby M. case recognized that a woman could
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One unanswered, critical question is whether it should make
any difference if the surrogate is carrying a child that was produced
using her own egg as opposed to a child that is not genetically re-
lated to her at all. Although it would seem that in the latter circum-
stance one could view the woman simply as an "incubator" for the
embryo, one cannot do this without dehumanizing her. As the
Court noted in Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth,4 the preg-
nant woman has more at stake in her pregnancy than her husband
does - even if, as Justice White argued in dissent - she is carrying
the only child her husband may ever have.4 This is because a wo-
man's body, not an inert incubator, is involved, and she is the one
who is undergoing all the physical risks, in addition to at least as
many psychological risks as the genetic father. Because she has
more at stake, personally and immediately, only she should have the
right to decide about an abortion. In Justice Blackmun's words,
"Since it is the woman who physically bears the child and who is
directly and immediately affected by the pregnancy, as between the
two, the balance weighs in her favor."'42 Moreover, even she should
not be able to alienate that right - because to do so puts her in the
position of an "incubator," at best a slave, at worse a simple
container. Such dehumanization, even if done "voluntarily," cannot
be constitutionally enforced by the state because of the intense im-
pact of pregnancy on the personhood of the pregnant woman. An
analogous argument suggests that between the genetic and gesta-
tional mother, the latter has a higher claim to be considered the
presumptive rearing mother, regardless of any prior contractual
agreement to waive or alienate her right to rear the child. In this
regard it should be noted that the technology of embryo transfer
(ET), the ability to transfer an embryo to the uterus of a woman not
genetically related to it, has forced us to ask a question unique in
legal history: (as between the genetic and gestational mother) who
is the mother of the child? More specifically, does the child's ge-
netic mother or the mother who bore the child have legal rights and
responsibilities to rear the child? Society has not yet answered this
question, but it would seem that based on the comparative contribu-
tions and risks taken, and to insure that the child has a protector
who can be unequivocally identified and will be present at birth, the
traditional legal rule should continue: the gestational mother
not irrevocably waive her right to terminate her pregnancy under the United States Constitu-
tion because judicial enforcement of such an agreement would be an intolerable burden on
the woman. 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (1987).
40 Planned Parenthood of Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
41 Id. at 93 (White, J., dissenting).
42 Id. at 71.
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should be considered the legal mother for all purposes, and this
presumption should be irrebuttable and unalterable by prior
contract.
43
The state has a much stronger interest in regulating commerce
than it has in regulating human reproduction. Thus, although a
general ban on the use of surrogacy might be successfully chal-
lenged (as interfering with a couple's constitutional right to procre-
ate without a compelling state interest), a ban on commercial
surrogacy or the buying and selling of human embryos would likely
survive constitutional challenge. This ban could be based both on
society's general distaste for the selling of children, involuntary ser-
vitude, or embryo selling, and also on the potential harms such
practices have to all of the participants, including the surrogate and
the resulting child, and the harms to society as a whole for sanction-
ing such a practice.44 On the other hand, it has been persuasively
argued that all surrogacy, paid and unpaid, should be banned be-
cause it is ironically self-deceptive, that it appears to empower wo-
men, but actually "reinforces oppressive gender roles." 45 The
ultimate decision on this issue depends upon whether the Court will
view the human embryo as a commodity, and thus properly an arti-
cle of commerce, or whether the Court will afford it a higher value
and thus protect it from abuse and exploitation, similar to the way
we now protect human organs, parks and certain species of wildlife.
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES WHEN THE INTERESTS OF A
PREGNANT WOMAN CONFLICT WITH THOSE OF THE
FETUS: MATERNAL-FETAL CONFLICTS
FETAL SURGERY
One of the major consequences of antenatal diagnosis of the
fetus has been to view the fetus as a patient, often termed the doc-
tor's "second patient." The ability to intervene to actually treat the
fetus, however, is very limited. In fact, most current methods can
only diagnose specific diseases or defects, and the only "treatment"
is the termination of the pregnancy. Obviously, this is usually done
not for the sake of the fetus (unless the condition is so devastating
that the fetus would be better off not existing), but for the family.
Because of a woman's right to abortion, she has the constitutional
right to terminate the pregnancy because her fetus is abnormal, or,
prior to viability, for any other reason.
43 Annas, Making Babies Without Sex: The Law and The Profits, 74 AM.J. PuB. HEALTH 1415
(1984); ELIAS & ANNAS, supra note 7.
44 Id. See also In the Matter of Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
45 Radin, Market Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1930 (1987).
THE PREGNANT WOMAN'S RIGHT TO PRIVACY
In the future, it will likely be possible to treat the affected fetus
for many conditions. Treatment of the fetus will involve the cooper-
ation of the pregnant woman, and might even put her own life or
health in danger. How should courts deal with the competing rights
of the fetus and the pregnant woman when treatment could lead to a
normal birth, but the pregnant woman prefers to terminate the
pregnancy, or to carry the affected fetus to term untreated?
The current state of the art is very primitive and highly experi-
mental. Fewer than 100 cases of hydrocephalus have been treated
by surgical decompression, with results that have been described as
"not encouraging." Even fewer fetuses have had surgery for urinary
tract obstruction, with somewhat better results. Other potential ar-
eas for the development of fetal surgery include diaphragmatic her-
nia, spina bifida, gastroschisis, and allogenic bone transplants.46
The fact that these procedures are currently highly invasive and
experimental means that they cannot be performed without the wo-
man's informed consent and that she is under no obligation to give
such consent. But assume the procedures are perfected and that
they not only become "standard medical procedures" but that they
can be performed with little or no risk to the pregnant woman.
Under such circumstances, will the pregnant woman be afforded the
same constitutional right to refuse to have her fetus operated on
while it is still inside her?
"FORCED CESAREAN-SECTION" CASES
There have been approximately two dozen court-ordered
"forced" cesarean sections in the United States. 47 Most have in-
volved poor women, racial minorities, and foreigners, and only two
of these cases have reached an appellate court level.
The first appellate case,Jefferson v. Griffen Spaulding County Hospi-
tal Authority,48 involved a Georgia woman who was due to deliver her
child in about four days and had previously notified the hospital that
it was her religious belief that the Lord had healed her body and
that whatever happened to the child was the Lord's will. Both the
hospital and a public agency sought an order requiring her to sub-
mit to a cesarean section. The odds that the child would die if a
vaginal birth was attempted were put at 99% to 100% by the physi-
cian. The court granted the petition, on the basis that the
46 S. ELIAS & G. J. ANNAS, supra note 33, at 243-50.
47 Ko!der, Gallagher & Parsons, Court-Ordered Obstetric Interventions, 316 NEw ENG. J. MED.
1192 (1987); see Rhoden, The Judge in the Delivery Room. The Emergence of Court-Ordered Cesareans,
74 CAL. L. REv. 1951 (1986).
48 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981). See G. ANNAS, JUDGING MEDICINE 119-25 (1988).
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state has an interest in the life of this unborn, living human
being [and] the intrusion involved.., is outweighed by the
duty of the State to protect a living, unborn human being
from meeting his or her death before being given the op-
portunity to live.49
The parents immediately petitioned the Georgia state court to
stay the order. On the evening of the day of the hearing, the court
denied their motion, with a two-sentence conclusory opinion.5" A
few days later, the woman uneventfully delivered a healthy baby
without surgical intervention.
The other appellate case is from Washington, D.C.5 "Angela
C." was a 28 year old terminally ill married woman. Her physicians
determined that she would die very soon, but she and they agreed to
a course of chemotherapy and radiation treatment to try to get her
to 28 weeks gestation, when the fetus would have a much better
chance to be born healthy. Hospital lawyers, however, called in a
Superior Court judge and asked him to determine what action to
take. At an emergency hearing held at the hospital, it was deter-
mined that while the patient had not consented to the immediate
removal of her fetus by cesarean section, immediate removal would
be best for the fetus, but it might accelerate Angela C.'s own de-
mise. The court ordered the cesarean section performed to try to
save the fetus.52 A telephone appeal for a stay was unsuccessful.
The fetus was delivered, but died shortly thereafter. The mother
died two days later.5" About six months later the appeals court ex-
plained in writing its refusal to grant a stay.
54
In re A. C. reads more like a sympathy card than a judicial opin-
ion. Its first paragraph ends with the following sentence: "Condo-
lences are extended to those who lost the mother and child."55 The
court acknowledges that its opinion might "reasonably" be seen as
"self-justifying" and then goes on to rationalize the denial of the
stay.56
The opinion rests on a number of false assumptions. The most
serious error is the statement that "as a matter of law, the right of a
woman to an abortion is different and distinct from her obligations
to the fetus once she has decided not to timely terminate her preg-
49Jefferson, 247 Ga. at 89, 247 S.E.2d 457 at 460.
50 Id.
51 In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. App. 1987), vacated, 529 A.2d 203 (D.C. App. 1988).
52 533 A.2d at 613.
53ld. at 612
54 1d. at 611.
55 Id.
56 1d. at 613.
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nancy."57 This is incorrect as both a factual and legal matter. An-
gela C. never "decided not to timely terminate her pregnancy," and
because of her fetus' affect on her health, under Roe v. Wade she
could have authorized her pregnancy to be terminated, to protect
her health, at any time prior to her death. Nothing in Roe v. Wade
requires a woman to put her own life or health in jeopardy to pro-
tect her fetus, even her viable fetus.
The second basis on which the opinion rests is that a parent
cannot refuse treatment necessary to save the life of a child (true),
58
and therefore a pregnant woman cannot refuse treatment necessary
to save the life of her fetus (false).59 The child must be treated be-
cause parents have obligations to act in the "best interests" of their
children (as defined by child neglect laws), and treatment in no way
compromises the bodily integrity of the parents. Fetuses, however,
are not independent persons, and cannot be treated without invad-
ing the mother's body. There are no "fetal neglect" statutes, and it
is unlikely that any could be written specifically enough to withstand
constitutional scrutiny. Treating the fetus against the will of the
mother requires us to degrade and dehumanize the mother and
treat her as an inert container. This may be acceptable once the
mother is dead (since her interests in bodily integrity die with her),
but is never acceptable when the mother is alive. The court seemed
to understand this intellectually, and thus ultimately justified its
opinion on the grounds that Angela C. was as good as dead, and had
no "good health" to be "sacrificed." "The cesarean section would
not significantly affect A.C.'s condition because she had, at best, two
days of sedated life ..... 60
But this reasoning will not do. It would, for example, permit
the involuntary removal of vital organs prior to death if needed to
"save a life." But if the child had already been born, it is unlikely
that any court would compel the child's mother to undergo major
surgery (e.g., a kidney "donation") no matter how dire the potential
consequences of refusal to the child. And no court would require
the father of a child to undergo surgery, even to save the child's life.
The ultimate rationale may be purely sexist: cesarean sections can
never be done on males, and these male judges are simply unable to
identify with pregnant women. 6'
57 
Id. at 614.
58 Id. at 616.
59 Id. at 616-17. The court actually wound up forcing Angela C. to have an abortion prior
to her death, since her fetus was not viable.
6°Id. at 616.
61 Annas, She's Going to Die: The Case of Angela C., 18 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 23 (Feb.
1988).
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Jefferson is not much better. In addition to misinterpreting Roe
v. Wade, it also relied on Raleigh-Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital
v. Anderson,62 which involved a woman who was approximately eight
months pregnant. Physicians believed that some time before giving
birth, she would hemorrhage severely and that both she and her fe-
tus would die if she did not submit to blood transfusions. She re-
fused blood transfusions because she was a Jehovah's Witness. The
trial court upheld her refusal, and the hospital appealed to the New
Jersey Supreme Court. In the meantime, the woman had left the
hospital against medical advice and the case became moot. Never-
theless, the court determined that the fetus was "entitled to the
law's protection" and that blood transfusions could be administered
to the woman "if necessary to save her life or the life of her child, as
the physician in charge at the time may determine."6
Raleigh-Fitkin is of limited value. First, no one was forced to do
anything as a result of the opinion; that is, no transfusion was actu-
ally performed, and no police were dispatched to apprehend the wo-
man and return her to the hospital. Second, it was a one-page
opinion, with little policy discussion. Third, the extent of bodily in-
vasion involved in a blood transfusion is much less than that in-
volved in a cesarean section, which is major abdominal surgery.
Fourth, the case was decided eight years before the same New Jersey
court decided the case of Karen Ann Quinlan,' which first applied
the right to privacy to medical treatment refusals.65
Griswold and Roe represent situations in which medical advances
were used by the United States Supreme Court to enhance the lib-
erty rights of women. The forced-cesarean cases, on the other
hand, illustrate the potential "dark side" of technology. Here medi-
cal advances, including ultrasound, fetal monitoring, safer cesarean
sections, and neonatal intensive care units were used not to enhance
the rights of pregnant women, but instead to provide an excuse to
ignore them, by concentrating exclusively on the potential child.
The lesson these cases teach is that technology untempered by
human rights can lead to brutal dehumanization of pregnant
women.
The position the Court will take on whether it is proper to force
a woman to consent to interventions like fetal surgery for the sake of
her fetus will depend on how the Court views the reasonableness of
6242 NJ. 421, 201 A.2d 537 (1964).
63 Id. at 423, 201 A.2d at 538.
64 Matter of Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
65 Id. at 662-64. See also Annas, Forced Cesareans: The Most Unkindest Cut ofAll, 12 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 16 (June 1982).
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the intervention. This, in turn, will be primarily determined by how
the medical profession views these procedures (e.g., as "heroic" or
routine), their success rates, and by the precise risks to the woman
forced to undergo the procedure. Where surgery involves general
anesthesia or actual physical invasion of a woman's body it is un-
likely that the Court would force a woman to undergo such a proce-
dure, and could not do so without treating the woman as a mere
container.66
The "waiver" argument posits that the right to abortion is
alienable; once a woman alienates it by deciding to carry the fetus to
term, she has an affirmative obligation to consent to any reasonable
medical or surgical intervention to help her fetus be as healthy as
possible. This, however, seems much more a moral construct of
what society hopes the "ideal mother" would do than a legal obliga-
tion to be enforced through the courts. The waiver argument seems
misplaced for at least two reasons. First, such a waiver never in fact
66 A legally analogous situation occurs when a court authorizes a "search and seizure" of
a substance that is inside the body of a criminal suspect. In the most famous "search and
seizure" case, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that having a physician take blood in a hospital to
determine whether an individual is under the influence of alcohol is "reasonable" under the
fourth amendment protection against unjustified searches and seizures because of the strong
interest the community had in fairly and accurately determining guilt or innocence, the inabil-
ity of determining intoxication by other means, and the very minor invasion of the body in-
volved in drawing blood which, "for most people involves virtually no risk, trauma, or pain."
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966). In an earlier case the Court found a
search unreasonable when police broke into a suspect's room, attempted to extract narcotics
capsules he had put in his mouth, and then rushed him to the hospital and insisted that an
emetic, be administered to induce vomiting. This violated the suspect's interests in "human
dignity." Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174 (1952). Even closer to the cesarean section
cases is a case in which the Court upheld a lower court ruling that it would be unreasonable
under the fourth amendment to order surgery to remove a bullet from an accused armed
robber who shot his victim and was in turn shot by him. The Court held, consistent with
Schmerber and Rochin, that the interests of the accused had to be balanced against the interests
of the state. The accused's primary interests were in maintaining "personal privacy and bod-
ily integrity." Removal of the bullet would require, among other things, general anesthesia.
In the Court's words:
When conduced with the consent of the patient, surgery requiring general anesthesia
is not necessarily demeaning or intrusive. In such a case, the surgeon is carrying out
the patient's own will concerning the patient's body and the patient's right to privacy
is therefore preserved. In this case, however.. .the Commonwealth proposes to take
control of respondent's body, to "drug this citizen-not yet convicted of a criminal of-
fense-with narcotics and barbiturates into a state of unconsciousness" and then to
search beneath his skin for evidence of a crime. This kind of surgery involves a virtually
total divestment of respondent's ordinary control over surgical probing beneath his skin. Winston
v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 765 (1985)(quoting Lee v. Winston, 717 F.2d 888, 901)(empha-
sis added).
Not only was the burden on the citizen great, the state had other evidence available to
make its case, so the search was not "reasonable." Id. Analogously, a forced cesarean section
is a much more intrusive and dangerous surgical procedure than the bullet removal, and
much more demeaning to the patient because it treats her simply as a container. On the other
hand, the potential state interest in the life of the fetus (soon-to-be-child) is very high.
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takes place. Women do not appear before judges to waive their
rights at any time during pregnancy. Second, and more important,
women have a constitutional right to bear children if they are physi-
cally able to do so. A legal rule that there are no restrictions on a
woman's decision to have an abortion, but if she elects childbirth
she thereby must surrender her basic rights of bodily integrity and
privacy, would be a state-created penalty on her exercise of her right
to bear a child.6 7 Such a penalty or "infringement" would be
unconstitutional.
On the other hand, if the intervention is viewed as trivial, such
as requiring the woman to take one pill that had no risks or side
effects and would prevent her child from being severely mentally
retarded, balancing the interests of the woman with those of the
state in preventing mental retardation might permit some state-
sanctioned action, the extent of which is unclear. For example,
could we force the woman's mouth open and jam the pill down her
throat, or put her in jail until she took it voluntarily? Ironically, su-
pervising more trivial interventions, such as diet and smoking, may
require more massive privacy invasion than one-time surgery.68
The extent of the woman's constitutional right to refuse treat-
ment would likely be technologically-determined and would turn on
whether a safe and effective treatment exists and could be delivered
in an unintrusive way. If so, future courts may well favor the state's
interest in the fetus' life and health over the woman's right to bodily
integrity.
FETAL ABUSE: THE CASE OF PAMELA MONSON STEWART
The Stewart case takes us one step further, and raises the issue
of "fetal abuse." Could the state constitutionally define a new crime
of "fetal abuse" similar to the current crime of "child abuse" and
use it to force a pregnant woman to take or refrain from taking cer-
tain actions that might be harmful to her fetus?
Reportedly Mrs. Stewart was, because of placenta previa,69 ad-
vised by her physician to refrain from taking drugs, to stay off her
feet, to avoid intercourse, and to seek immediate medical attention
should she begin to hemorrhage. According to the police, she ig-
nored this advice by having intercourse with her husband and taking
6 7 Johnsen, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts With Women's Constitutional Rights to Liberty,
Privacy and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599 (1986).
68 Miller, Rights in Conflict? The Pregnant Woman vs. The Fetus at Risk, MASS. MED. 17-18
(Sept. - Oct. 1986).
69 Placenta previa is the condition in which the placenta is in the lower segment of the
uterus, extending to the margin of the internal os of the cervix or partially or completely
obstructing the os.
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some amphetamines. Mrs. Stewart stayed at home after she first no-
ticed some bleeding and did not go to the hospital until many hours
later. Her son was born with massive brain damage, and died six
weeks later. Criminal charges were filed under California's child
support statute, which includes "unborn children":
If a parent of a minor child willfully omits, without lawful
excuse, to furnish necessary clothing, food, shelter or medical
attendance, or other remedial care for his or her child, he or she
is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine not exceed-
ing two thousand dollars, or by imprisonment [for one
year] .7o
The case was dismissed in early 1987 because the trial judge
determined that this statute did not apply to her conduct. 7' But this
does not determine how a similar case would be decided under a
statute worded differently. The prosecution, for example, alleged
that "disobeying instructions" or "failure to follow through on med-
ical advice" should be grounds for criminal action. The danger in
this approach is changing the nature of the doctor-patient relation-
ship, and the nature of physician advice. Physicians are neither po-
licemen nor psychics, and medical "advice" is an inherently vague
term. To be effective in protecting fetuses, monitoring patient
compliance with medical advice would be necessary. This might re-
quire confining pregnant women to an environment in which eating,
exercise, drug use, and sexual intercourse could be controlled.
Other quandaries arise if child neglect statutes are applied to
fetuses. Unlike a child, a fetus is absolutely dependent upon its
mother and cannot be "treated" without in some way invading the
mother. The "fetal protection" policy enunciated by the Stewart
prosecution seems to assume that, like mother and child, mother
and fetus are two separate individuals with separate rights. But
treating them separately before birth can only be done by favoring
one over the other. Favoring the fetus radically devalues the preg-
nant woman treating her like an inert incubator, or a culture me-
dium for the fetus.
This view makes women unequal; since only they can have chil-
dren, a fetal neglect statute relegates women to performing one
function: childbearing. It is one thing for the physician to view the
fetus as a patient; it is another for the state to assume that the fetus'
interests are opposed to its mother's, and to require treatment of
7 0 CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1986)(emphasis added).
71 Annas, supra note 48, at 96. See also Note, Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs: The Case
Against the Criminalization of "Fetal Abuse", 101 HARV. L. REV. 994 (1988).
230 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. XIII NO. 2-3
the fetus by forcing the mother to subrogate her own rights to those
of her fetus.
Another problem is more technical: what is "fetal neglect?"
Child neglect covers a wide variety of activities, but generally in-
volves failure to provide certain things, like clothing, food, housing
or medical attention, to the child. Such laws do not, however, require
parents to provide "optimal" clothing, food, housing or medical at-
tention to their children, and do not even forbid taking risks with
children, such as engaging in dangerous sports, or affirmatively in-
juring children in the form of punishment to teach them a lesson.
72
Even if we can define fetal neglect, we are left with the inherently
sexist application of the law. On the surface at least, it would seem
that the primary reason to attempt to make fetal abuse laws stricter
than child abuse laws is that such laws can only apply to women.
While this type of sex discrimination could survive current equal
protection analysis, Sylvia Law has proposed a workable intermedi-
ate scrutiny framework for equal protection analysis that would, in
fact, protect women and which coercive fetal neglect laws could not
survive:
[L]aws governing reproductive biology should be scruti-
nized by courts to ensure that (1) the law has no significant
impact in perpetuating either the oppression of women or
culturally imposed sex-role constraints on individual free-
dom or (2) if the law has this impact, it is justified as the
best means of serving a compelling state interest.73
Society can never force a woman to take actions for the sake of
her fetus without treating her as something less than a competent
adult. Education, service provision, and enhanced opportunities
seem most likely to improve the plight of fetuses and pregnant wo-
men alike.7 4 But if we do not follow the road of equal opportunity
and provision of reasonable health care, and if sophisticated meth-
ods to monitor the health of fetuses are developed, the rights of
women could well become subordinate to the welfare of their fe-
tuses. The result would be a return to oppressive gender-based dis-
crimination. This threat would be real in a future society which, like
that envisioned by Margaret Atwood in The Handmaid's Tale,75 has a
dwindling population and needs every birth possible to maintain
itself.
72 Id.
73 Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 1009 (1984).
74 ELIAS & ANNAS, supra note 33, at 262.
75 M. ATwooD, supra note 4.
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CONCLUSION
Technology's leading historian, Lewis Mumford, has noted that
scientific knowledge has a dark side that only social policy and law is
powerful enough to attempt to avoid. When "not touched by a
sense of values [scientific knowledge] works . . . toward a complete
dehumanization of the social order." He continues:
The plea that each of the sciences must be permitted to go
its own way without control should be immediately rebut-
ted by pointing out that they obviously need a little gui-
dance when their applications in war and industry are so
plainly disastrous ...76
Reliance on the notion of "values" unfortunately can no longer
serve in an age that has cheapened that term to mean, at best, a call
for moral relativism, and at worst, a reflection of personal taste. In-
deed, it is probably because of our current vacuous notion of values
that they are touted as potential saviors from the many dehumaniz-
ing technologies devised by the minds of men. Values do nothing to
slow the pace of "progress," and offer no threat to the technological
imperative. Langdon Winner has persuasively argued that we need
much more, something with meaning. He has suggested law, with
its focus on human rights, as essential. Among other things, he has
noted that Moses did not come down from the mountain with "Ten
Values" and that the first ten amendments to the Constitution are
not called the "Bill of Values." 77
It is insufficient to note that "scientific and technological ad-
vance" has changed "the very conceptions of human rights" by trans-
forming the type of lives we lead and changing our view of the
human necessities to include things that have traditionally been con-
sidered luxuries. 78 We must incorporate technological change into
a coherent view of humanness, and identify what rights humans
should be able to lay claim to against their government. This will
not be an easy task, and the Constitution, and its interpreter, the
Court, are necessary, but not sufficient instruments to accomplish it.
More than our notion of human rights is being transformed by sci-
ence and technology: our very notion of what it means to be human
is being changed. And this recognition must be followed by mean-
76 THE LEWIS MUMFORD READER (D. Miller ed. 1986).
77 L. WINNER, THE WHALE AND THE REACTOR: A SEARCH FOR LIMITS IN AN AGE OF HIGH
TECHNOLOGY 155-63 (1986). See also R. DRINAN, CRY OF THE OPPRESSED: THE HISTORY OF THE
HUMAN RIGHTS REVOLUTION (1987).
78 Holton, The Advance of Science and Its Burdens in Art and Science, 115 DAEDALUS 75 (No.
3 1986)
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ingful dialogue aimed at distilling those characteristics of human life
we find essential to give it meaning and worth.
It is inconceivable that all the potential changes in humanness,
science and technology can bring us are "good" and are thus to be
welcomed as part of the "good life." The advent of the nuclear age
sufficiently rebuts this claim. But in medicine, a field which has al-
ways been seen as beneficent, we are less likely to be on guard
against potentially dangerous threats to human well-being. The
challenge to our Bill of Rights and its guardians is to appreciate that
technology is more than a tool; that rights are more than values; and
that only by safeguarding what we have come to accept as funda-
mental human rights are we likely to enjoy a future as human beings,
with some coherent concept of what it means to live well on this
planet. In any such discussion, the right to privacy is likely to be
viewed as a central right of citizens, and as one especially critical to
preserving our notions of the mother-child relationship and the per-
sonhood of pregnant women in a world of rapidly-expanding medi-
cal technology. Justice Blackmun's admonition in Thornburgh seems
an appropriate note on which to conclude:
Our cases long have recognized that the Constitution em-
bodies a promise that a certain sphere of individual liberty
will be kept largely beyond the reach of government . ..
That promise extends to women as well as to men.
79 Thornburgh v. ACOG, 476 U.S. 747 772 (1986)(emphasis added).
